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By: Danita Catherine Burke 
 
The Northwest Passage Dispute 
 
Authors note: This short contribution summarizes and adds to the research recently published by 
the author through Palgrave Macmillan, Danita Catherine Burke, 2018, International Disputes 
and Cultural Ideas in the Canadian Arctic (http://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319619163) 
and in a previous journal article, Danita Catherine Burke, 2017, ‘Leading by example: Canada 
and its Arctic stewardship role’, International Journal of Public Policy, 13(1-2), pp. 36-52 
(https://www.inderscienceonline.com/doi/abs/10.1504/IJPP.2017.081050).  
 
--- 
 
What is the Northwest Passage and why is it seen as a disputed area? 
 
The Northwest Passage is a series of passageways through the waters of the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago, a group of Canadian islands north of the Canadian mainland. The historical drivers 
behind the dispute over the Northwest Passage stem primarily from the evolution of the role that 
the Arctic plays in Canada’s national identity, particularly in the Canadian North, combined with 
competing interpretations of the Law of the Sea concerning how to classify waterways.   
 
As far as Canadians are concerned, the Northwest Passage is Canadian. This is a non-negotiable 
point so, from the Canadian perspective, there is no dispute. The Government of Canada even 
went as far as renaming the Northwest Passage the “Canadian Northwest Passage” in 2009 to 
underscore this point.  
 
Canada claims that the Northwest Passage is part of its historic internal waters. This means that 
the waterways have the same legal status as a Canadian lake or river and are under the complete 
control of the government to regulate and enforce Canadian laws. Canada cites historic use of the 
waters, particularly the millennium of use by Canadian Inuit peoples, and the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) 1951 Fisheries Case to support its claim.
1
  
 
The Fisheries Case ruling stated that Norway had the right to draw straight baselines to encase a 
large region of its northern waters and designate them as Norwegian waters despite this not being 
the standard procedure of drawing coastal baselines. Canada argues that like Norway it too has 
the right to implement straight baselines, which it did in 1985, around the outer limit of the 
Arctic Archipelago making waters landward of these baselines internal waters.  
 
The United States has historically been the main opponent of Canada’s position,2 arguing that the 
Northwest Passage is an international strait, an area of high seas that connects two bodies of 
water which is open for peaceful use by a vessel from any state. Other states, such as China,
3
 
also have a similar stance on the Northwest Passage’s status. The United States cites the ICJ 
1949 Corfu Channel Case to support its argument.
4
  
 
In the Corfu Channel Case Albania lost its bid to classify the Corfu Channel as its territorial 
waters.
5
 The ruling noted the channel connects two parts of high seas and had a significant 
volume of international traffic over a long period of time thereby making it an international 
strait. The ruling permitted innocent passage, meaning passageway that does not threaten the 
coastal state, through the waters without the need of Albania’s permission.  
  
The United States’ position stems from its long-standing policy of freedom of the seas as this 
freedom of movement is essential to its international military role and agenda. A willingness to 
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recognize an ally’s claim could have drastic negative implications elsewhere with states that the 
United States are on less cooperative terms with and who have similar views that waterways are 
domestic internal waters, such as Russia’s stance on the Northern Sea Route. 
 
This disagreement between Canada and the United States was never resolved. Rather, it went 
dormant with the negotiation of the 1988 Canada-United States Agreement on Arctic 
Cooperation (ACA).
6
 The ACA signaled that both sides agreed to disagree about the Northwest 
Passage. Presently renewed international interest in the Arctic sparked by global warming, 
climate change, and the draw of economic opportunities mean that the issue is no longer 
bilateral. The international interest in access to Arctic’s economic opportunities could have 
implications for the Northwest Passage dispute, as recently signaled on the 26 January 2018 by 
China’s first Arctic Policy document where it articulated its stance that it also sees both the 
Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route as international straits.
7
  
 
How did this dispute develop and how did it impact discussions about Arctic navigation? 
 
The dispute was ignited in earnest in 1969-1970. Up until that period, the Government of Canada 
did not have a firm stance on its claims to the waters. Canada was able to defer making maritime 
claims due to a combination of the region’s limited use, which reduced pressure for any 
immediate action, and positive bilateral cooperation and tactful diplomacy with the United States 
during the 1940s and 1950s, since the Americans were the most present foreign power in the 
Canadian Arctic at that time. Such diplomatic efforts included how both sides negotiated United 
States’ access and use of the Arctic waters to construct of the Dew Lines Early Warning 
System.
8
  
 
The well-documented 1969 SS Manhattan incident created the paradigm shift in the 
government’s policy toward Canada’s sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. The incident 
involved an American oil tanker, SS Manhattan, testing the waterway’s viability as a shipping 
route for oil from Alaska’s North Slope to the Eastern seaboard. The United States government 
triggered the incident by refusing to ask Canadian permission to send an accompanying United 
States Coast Guard vessel to assist the commercial testing exercise. 
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 Motivated by concerns about sovereignty erosion and environmental risks (e.g. oil spills) the 
incident ignited Canadian public awareness and outrage about the Government of Canada’s lack 
of formal claims to Arctic sovereignty and jurisdiction, particularly over the Northwest Passage 
which had long been viewed as part of Canada. The fallout of the SS Manhattan incident 
motivated the Government of Canada to begin the process of establishing its layered claims to 
jurisdiction and sovereignty over the Northwest Passage and other Arctic waters, which 
continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
Canada’s efforts to establish its claims over the Northwest Passage developed into an established 
leadership role in Arctic maritime protection negotiations. This included passing the 1970 Arctic 
Waters Pollution Prevention Act,
9
 a landmark piece of domestic legislation which established the 
idea of stewardship as a cornerstone for Canada’s role in the Arctic. This act inspired Article 234 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which makes an exception for 
interference in shipping in ice-covered regions for environmental protection purposes. More 
recently,
10
 Canada took a leadership role in the development of the Polar Code. The Polar Code 
came into effect in 1 January 2017 and “covers the full range of design, construction, equipment, 
operational, training, search and rescue and environmental protection matters relevant to ships 
operating in the inhospitable waters surrounding the two poles”.11 
 
The role of commercial players in the dispute 
 
Companies have shown that they can impact regional maritime disputes. In the Beaufort Sea, for 
example, there is a large 21 436 km
2
 pie shaped maritime boundary dispute between Canada and 
the United States. Both sides have tried to auction off leases for oil exploration in the disputed 
zone, but companies generally avoid bidding, thereby stopping either state from using them to 
escalate the disagreement. The development of the dispute over the Northwest Passage is also 
likely to be impacted by commercial decisions.  
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According to the Government of the Northwest Territories:  
A record number (30) of vessels transited through the Northwest Passage in 2012. In 
2013, for the first time, a large bulk carrier transited the Northwest Passage. Only 17 
vessels managed the full northwest passages in 2014, due to a short and cold summer.
12
 
There is little dispute that the Northwest Passage technically connects two bodies of waters – the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans – but the lack of volume of traffic transiting through the waterways 
has helped support Canada’s argument that the Northwest Passage does not qualify as an 
international strait.  
 
At the moment, most traffic in the Canadian Arctic is either by a Canadian vessel or a vessel that 
stops at Canadian locations as part of resource extraction efforts or community resupplying. As a 
result, these vessels come under Canada’s rule of law. They also tend to follow Canada’s rules of 
procedure for regional navigation, such as adhering to the AWPPA regulations and registering 
with Canada’s mandatory Northern ship monitoring system, NORDEG.13  
 
Foreign naval submarines have also long been suspected of using Canada’s Arctic waters. These 
deployments are occasionally discussed in the context of whether submarine traffic could impact 
the legal status of the Northwest Passage. By and large, however, the conclusion is that 
submarine activity is primarily covert, and data is not reported or available for public discussion 
or debate. As such, military submarine activity does not count toward the volume of traffic 
required to establish a waterway as an international strait.
14
  
 
The focus has instead been on commercial activities. Even with the possibility of a shorter 
shipping distance, shipping in the Arctic is a risky undertaking.  
Even if relatively ice-free in late summer, the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea 
remain difficult to navigate with their unmarked shallow areas, shifting sand-gravel bars, 
fog, and dangerous weather. Increasing shipping in the region would require a high 
preparedness for potential environmental incidents.
15
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Long periods of regional darkness and high insurance rates for vessels navigating in Arctic 
waters, will also mitigate shipping development interest and encourage businesses to take 
precautions, like following local safety regulations and laws developed to help in regional 
navigation.
16
  
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, the dispute over the legal status Northwest Passage has been ongoing for decades. There 
are no inherent benefits for either Canada or the United States to alter their respective positions 
on the dispute. As more states wade in on the legal status of the Northwest Passage, the 
Government of Canada needs to find more concrete ways to ensure its claims will be respected. 
Global warming and climate change are game changers and a major factor that will impact how 
this dispute evolves is how relevant commercial players approach Canadian laws and regulations 
going forward as economic activity in the region increases.   
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